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Abstract: Recently, merging signal processing techniques with information security services has found a lot of attention. 
Steganography and steganalysis are among those trends. Like their counterparts in cryptology, steganography and 
steganalysis are in a constant battle. Steganography methods try to hide the presence of covert messages in innocuous-
looking data, whereas steganalysis methods try to break steganography algorithms and reveal the existence of hidden 
messages. The stream nature of audio signals, their popularity, and their wide spread usage make them very good candidates 
for steganography. This has led to a very rich literature on both steganography and steganalysis of audio signals. This paper 
intends to conduct a comprehensive review of audio steganalysis methods aggregated over near fifteen years. To that end, 
both compressed and con-compressed methods are reviewed, and then their important details are presented in different 
tables. Furthermore, some of the most recent audio steganalysis methods (both non-compressed and compressed ones) are 
implemented and comparative analyses on their performances are conducted. Finally, the paper provides some possible 
directions for future researches on audio steganalysis. 
 
1. Introduction 
Digital computers have revolutionized every aspect of 
our lives. Information security is one of the branches of 
science that has benefited entirely from this invention. In 
particular, merging signal processing techniques with 
information security services has found a lot of attention. 
Some of these new trends include multimedia encryption 
systems and their cryptanalysis [1, 2], multimedia secret 
sharing, steganography, steganalysis, and watermarking. 
Each of these techniques serves a different purpose. For 
example, multimedia encryption addresses confidentiality 
and watermarking serves the purpose of copyright protection. 
Among these techniques, steganography is exceptionally 
interesting. Arguably, the main purposes of steganography 
are privacy and preventing traffic analysis. In other words, 
while encryption prevents unauthorized access to the data, it 
cannot conceal pattern of communications. Therefore, an 
adversary who is watching the channel can obtain very 
valuable information including time of communications, 
frequency of communications, size of messages, identity of 
senders and recipients, and much more. Steganography is one 
possible solution to such problems.  
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Steganography is best described in terms of subliminal 
channels. Subliminal channels were first introduced under the 
prisoner’s problem [3]. Two accomplices in a crime are 
apprehended and imprisoned in two different cells. The 
warden, who wants to gather some information, allows them 
to communicate as long as he can read their messages. 
Apparently, the culprits want to talk about escape plan, but 
they could not use encrypted messages. Therefore, they use 
innocuous looking messages and hide their escape plan inside 
them.  
Steganalysis is the countermeasure of the warden 
against such hidden messages and at the same time it can also 
help with improving security of existing steganography 
methods [4]. Because steganography changes content of 
cover signal, usually it leaves a trail and thus it can be 
detected. Consequently, steganalysis is a decision problem 
and if it is solved for a specific method with a high probability, 
that method is considered broken [5]. If embedding method 
and statistical model of cover is known, optimal detector can 
be constructed. But, usually such information in not available 
and therefore steganalysis systems are usually constructed 
based on feature extraction and machine learning techniques 
[6]. Figure 1 presents typical block diagram of such systems.  
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of typical steganalysis systems 
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Steganalysis is broadly divided into targeted and 
universal methods. In the targeted paradigm, the warden 
knows the embedding algorithm. On the other hand, universal 
methods do not have such assumptions [5]. We can also 
divide universal methods into blind and semi-blind systems. 
Blind systems are constructed only from cover signals. On the 
other hand, semi-blind systems use both classes for 
determining the decision boundaries. Additionally, two 
different models of passive and active warden exist. A passive 
warden listens to communications without interfering with it 
and his only goal is to detect the presence of hidden messages. 
But, an active warden tries to prevent communications of 
hidden messages [5]. Other terms that need to be 
distinguished are active and passive steganalysis. Passive 
steganalysis only determines the existence of hidden 
messages whereas active steganalysis goes one step further 
and provides the warden with extra information such as the 
length of hidden message and/or its location. 
Current literature lacks a comprehensive review of 
audio steganalysis methods. This motivated us to review near 
fifteen years of work on audio steganalysis. This review paper 
is organized as follows. The next two sections are devoted to 
the detection of non-compressed steganography methods. To 
that end, universal and targeted steganalysis methods are 
reviewed in sections 2 and 3, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 
are devoted to steganalysis of compressed methods. In section 
6 comparative analyses of audio steganalysis methods are 
presented. Section 7 describes some possible directions for 
future research on audio steganalysis and finally the paper is 
concluded in section 8. Figure 2 summarizes the classification 
that we have used in this paper with number of relevant sub-
sections. 
2. Universal non-compressed methods 
Universal audio steganalysis are broadly divided into 
non-calibrated and calibrated methods. In the non-calibrated 
case, steganalysis features are directly extracted from audio 
signal. On the other hand, in the calibrated case, steganalysis 
features are extracted by comparing audio signal with its 
estimated cover/stego signal. Figure 3 compares these two 
approaches.  
2.1. Non-calibrated methods 
In these methods, features are extracted directly from 
the signal and they can be categorized according to their 
feature domain. Although, in some cases such distinction is 
very hard, yet this methodology is both very common and 
informative. Figure 3.A depicts a simple schematic of feature 
extraction in non-calibrated methods.  
 
Figure 2. Classification of audio steganalysis methods. The number in the parenthesis shows the relevant sub-section of this paper 
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Figure 3. Different approaches to universal audio steganalysis (A) non-calibrated approach (B) calibrated approach 
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2.1.1. Time domain features 
2.1.1.1. IDS and Steganalysis 
Preventing information piracy and its unauthorized 
disclosure could be an important application of steganalysis. 
This fact motivated Dittmann to incorporate steganalysis into 
intrusion detection systems (IDS) [7]. Such applications have 
real-time requirements; therefore, the system was constructed 
with simple features and thresholding for making the decision. 
More specifically, the ratio of ones to zeros in least 
significance bit (LSB) of signals was used as steganalysis 
feature.  
2.1.1.2. Linear prediction residue  
This technique assumed that audio signals are 
stationary and their samples are highly correlated over short 
period of time. Embedding process imposes faint changes on 
the correlation between neighbouring samples. Therefore, if 
the warden knows the correlation between cover samples, he 
can detect the abnormalities induced by the embedding 
process. This idea was implemented in [8]. In this work, 
linear prediction code (LPC) was used to extract the 
correlation between neighbouring samples. Furthermore, to 
extract correlation of different frequency bands, LPC was 
applied on the wavelet coefficients of all sub-bands. This 
work used two different feature sets. The first set provided 
the statistical details of signal in the frequency domain and 
the second set modelled irregularities in the correlation 
between samples of signal. These two sets were calculated as 
higher order statistics (HOS) of wavelet coefficients and LPC 
prediction errors, respectively. The method was cross-
validated with different embedding capacities of Steghide 
algorithm [9]. Considering the trade-off between missed 
detection and false alarm, the best result was achieved when 
the system was trained with stegos embedded at 20% of 
maximum capacity. 
2.1.1.3. Statistical model of histogram 
Another possibility is determining the distribution of 
wavelet coefficients. Fu et al. proposed to extract different 
statistics from wavelet coefficients and their frequency 
domain counterparts [10]. This method also benefited from 
principle component analysis (PCA) for dimension reduction. 
The results demonstrated that applying PCA reduces 
dimensionality of the feature space considerably with only 
negligible degradation in the performance. The method was 
tested on different wavelet-based steganography algorithms.  
2.1.1.4. Chaotic-based Steganalysis 
Most of the reviewed works assumed audio signals are 
stationary and they are outputs of linear systems. However, 
more recent studies on speech signals have found evidences 
of some phenomena which linear model cannot describe. 
Researchers have been able to model such phenomena with 
chaos theory.  Based on such models, noise of steganography 
would change chaotic structure of audio signal. Therefore, by 
extracting features from the chaotic structure of audio signals 
we can distinguish between covers and stegos. This path was 
followed in [11]. After investigating different chaotic-based 
measurements, it was concluded that false neighbour fraction 
and Lyapunov spectrum were more discriminative for 
steganalysis. The steganalysis system was tested on different 
settings and it was compared with other methods. The work 
concluded that performances of all methods were comparable 
for detection of watermarking, but chaotic-based features 
detected steganography methods more reliably.  
2.1.1.5. Features based on Markov process 
Markov processes are the simplest generalization of 
independent processes and they are very popular for 
steganalysis. These processes have the interesting property 
that the past has no influence on the future sample, if the 
present value is known. If such a system has only finite 
number of states, it is called a Markov chain. Markov chain 
of a random variable X is completely determined by its 
transition probability matrix and it is defined in equation (1). 
𝑃𝑥𝑦 = 𝑝(𝑋 𝑛 + 1 = 𝑦 | 𝑋 𝑛 = 𝑥)          (1) 
In [12], Markov transition of the second order 
derivatives of audio signals were used for steganalysis. To 
keep the number of features low, transition range of the 
Markov chain was limited to [-4, 4]. Furthermore, using this 
range leads to extracting features from smooth regions of 
signal rather than regions with dramatic changes. This work 
also argued that besides embedding strength, complexity of 
audio signals can affect performance of steganalysis. This 
work proposed the following metric for fast computation of 
audio signal complexity: 
𝐶𝑥 𝑛 =
𝑁 ∑ 𝑥′′ 𝑛 𝑁−2𝑛=0
(𝑁 − 2)∑ 𝑥 𝑛 𝑁−1𝑛=0
                                                                 (2) 
where, 𝑥′′ n  and N denote the second order derivative and 
length of the signal, respectively. Based on this metric, audio 
signals were divided into three categories of low, middle, and 
high complexities and each category was tested separately. 
The simulations showed that these features had good 
performance even for audio signals with high levels of 
complexities. This method was later refined with transition 
range of [-6, 6] and a bigger database for evaluation [13]. 
2.1.1.6. Autoregressive time delay neural network 
Determining the appropriate feature extraction is one 
of the biggest challenges in steganalysis. Considering the 
difficulty of modelling temporal characteristics of audio 
signals, this decision becomes even harder. A special type of 
networks known as autoregressive time delay neural network 
(AR-TDNN) was proposed in [14] to address this problem. 
AR-TDNN has the advantage that feature extraction is not 
specified explicitly, but the network implements both feature 
extraction and classification parts of the system.  
Implementation of these networks has two parts. In the 
TDNN part, samples of the input are fed into the network and 
it combines feedback of the output with delayed samples of 
the input for extracting useful patterns. On the other hand, the 
autoregressive part of system recognizes the sequence of the 
previously learned patterns. The efficacy of the system was 
tested on both LSB and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) 
embedding algorithms. 
2.1.2. Frequency domain features 
These methods primarily use frequency domain 
features for distinguishing between covers and stegos. 
2.1.2.1. Steganalysis based on MFCC  
Mel-frequency cepstrum coefficients (MFCC) are one of 
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the most well-known features in speech processing 
applications. Cepstrums are frequency components of the 
logarithm of the magnitude of spectral power of the signal 
and it can be interpreted as the rate of power changes in 
different frequency regions. MFCC is a modified version of 
cepstrum and it reflects some of characteristics of the human 
auditory system (HAS). Let X[jw] denotes frequency 
components of signal x[n], equations (3, 4) shows calculation 
of MFCC.   
𝐸𝑘 = ∑(|𝑋 𝑗𝑤 |
𝑁−1
𝑗=0
.𝑊𝑘 𝑗 ), 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑀                                             (3) 
𝐶𝑘 = |𝐹
−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑘))|  , 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑀                                                    (4) 
where N is the length of x[n], {Wk} are a set of triangular 
weighting functions that their centres have equal distances in 
the Mel scale (figure 4.B), M is the number of weighting 
functions, , 𝐹−1 denotes inverse Fourier transform, and 𝐶𝑘s 
are MFCCs. 
Based on potency of MFCC for speech recognition 
applications, it was proposed for audio steganalysis in [15]. 
This work focused on steganalysis of VoIP channels and it 
used three sets of features. The first set was statistical 
characteristics of the signal, and it included entropy, LSB 
ratio, flipping rate of LSB, and some other time domain 
statistical moments. The second set consisted of 29 MFCCs 
and the third set was based on the hypothesis that removing 
speech-relevant portion of the signal improves steganalysis. 
Therefore, the signal in the range of 200 to 6819.59 hertz was 
filtered. Then MFCCs of the filtered signal were calculated. 
Efficacy of this method was tested on five steganography and 
four watermarking methods. Furthermore, different 
combinations of feature sets were investigated. The tests 
confirmed that removing speech-relevant portions of signals 
improved performance of steganalysis.  
Another work argued that derivative of the signal is 
more informative for steganalysis [16]. This work showed 
that taking the second order derivative of signal improves 
discriminative properties of high-frequency regions. An 
experiment was conducted to justify this idea where, the 
whole spectrum was divided into 80 different regions. 
Comparing discriminative property of different regions 
showed that high frequency regions were more informative. 
To investigate the potency of the method, the system was 
contrasted with ordinary MFCC and wavelet-based MFCC. 
Results showed that the derivative-based MFCC had the best 
results.  
To implement a more powerful system different 
features were combined in [17]. First, short-term 
characteristics of signal were extracted from 12 MFCCs. The 
second set consisted different moments of spectral 
characteristics from the second order derivative of the signal. 
Finally, features based on audio quality metric [18] and LPC 
residue [8] were extracted. This work fused all of these 
features and formed a vector of 52 features. Then, feature 
selection was conducted based on F-scores and the system 
was tested in both targeted and universal scenarios.  
2.1.2.2. Reversed-psychoacoustic model of human 
hearing 
Ghasemzadeh et al. argued that employing features 
based on models of human auditory system (HAS) is counter 
intuitive for steganalysis and it would lead to discarding vital 
information [19]. According to this work, a steganography 
method is insecure if its stegos are distinguishable from its 
covers. Therefore, in its most basic form, the human 
perception should be oblivious to steganography induced 
noise. Based on this, it was argued that if features are 
extracted based on models of HAS their significance would 
diminish. To address this, an artificial auditory system was 
designed that could virtually hear effect of steganography and 
therefore could discriminate stegos from covers. This new 
model was called reversed Mel and it had the maximum 
deviation from HAS. That is, it had finer resolution in high 
frequencies and coarser resolution in low frequencies. 
Equations (5, 6) compares Mel and R-Mel scales. 
𝑀𝑒𝑙 = 1127 × 𝑙 𝑛 (1 +
𝑓
700
)                                                             (5) 
𝑅𝑀𝑒𝑙 = 1127 × 𝑙 𝑛 (1 +
𝐹𝑠/2 − 𝑓
700
)                                                 (6) 
where, f and FS denote the given frequency in hertz and the 
sampling frequency of the signal, respectively. Figure 4.A 
presents a comparison between Mel and R-Mel scales. In 
addition, calculation of cepstrum coefficients relies on a set 
of triangular windows. Figure 4.B compares windows 
constructed based on Mel and R-Mel scales.  
This work was further improved in [20]. Let c[n], s[n], 
and e[n] denote cover, stego, and its steganography noise, 
respectively. A common formulation of steganography is: 
𝑠 𝑛 = 𝑐 𝑛 + 𝑒 𝑛                                                                                  (7) 
 
Figure 4. Comparison between R-Mel and Mel (A) R-Mel scale vs Mel scale (B) Filter banks constructed based on R-Mel and Mel 
(A) (B)
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 To justify that maximum deviation from HAS is 
beneficial for audio steganalysis, spectrums of covers and 
their steganography noise was divided into L disjoint sub-
bands [20]: 
(𝑖 − 1) ×
𝜋
𝐿
≤ 𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑖 ×
𝜋
𝐿
   , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝐿                                             (8) 
Then, sub-band signal to noise ratio (𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑖) was defined as: 
𝑆𝑁𝑅𝑖 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (
∫ |𝐶(𝑗𝑤)|2
𝐵𝑖
∫ |𝐸(𝑗𝑤)|2
𝐵𝑖
) , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝐿                                 (9) 
Where, 𝐶(𝑗𝑤) and 𝐸(𝑗𝑤) denote the spectrum of cover and its 
steganography noise. This work compared plot of SNRi for 
different steganography methods with frequency resolution 
of Mel and R-Mel scales and showed that R-Mel scale was 
more suitable for steganalysis purposes. The work also used 
HOS for providing better discriminative properties. Finally, 
genetic algorithm (GA) [21] was invoked to find the optimum 
sub-set of features. This method was tested on a wide range 
of data hiding algorithms including both LSB and non-LSB 
methods. Furthermore, results of both targeted and universal 
scenarios were investigated. The results showed that HOS 
and feature selection based on GA improve performance of 
steganalysis considerably. 
2.2. Calibrated methods 
Finding features that are independent from contents of 
signal and only reflects the presence of hidden message is one 
of the most challenging problems in steganalysis. Apparently, 
if the cover is known such features can be extracted very 
easily. But, in the realistic scenarios this assumption does not 
hold. Therefore, researchers have proposed estimation as a 
practical solution to this dilemma.  
2.2.1. Self-generated estimation of cover 
This idea was proposed in [18] and it is based on 
representing steganography as an additive noise (equation 7). 
If that noise is found effectively, virtually a good estimation 
of the cover signal would be available. This is the main 
rationale behind steganalysis methods of this category. 
Basically, these methods estimate the cover by applying a 
noise removal procedure on the signal. Also, it is expected 
that different amount of noise is extracted from stegos and 
covers. These methods have employed different approaches 
to quantify such discrepancies.  
2.2.1.1. Steganalysis based on Audio Quality 
Metrics (AQM) 
This idea was proposed by Ozer el al. [18] and the 
wavelet-thresholding was employed for noise removal and 
estimation of the cover. If discrepancies between estimated 
covers and stego are measured accurately, they can be 
distinguished. This work noticed that, in speech coding 
applications, researchers have been trying to address a similar 
problem for measuring artefacts of speech coders for a long 
time. Result of those endeavours is a set of measurements 
known as audio quality metrics (AQM), which can be 
categorized into three groups of time, frequency, and 
perceptual domains. AQMs measure discrepancies between 
short frames of the reference signal and its modified version 
and the final metrics are calculated as the average value of 
each metric over all frames.  
The same methodology was adapted for steganalysis 
where signal under inspection and its denoised version were 
considered as the reference and modified signals. Then, their 
discrepancies were evaluated through AQMs. Finally, these 
metrics were used as steganalysis features. Work of [18] 
tested different combinations of feature selections and 
machine learning methods.  
2.2.1.2. Steganalysis based on Hausdorff Distance 
Liu et al. argued that AQMs have been designed 
specifically for objective assessment of the quality of audio 
signals and not steganography impairments [22]. They noted 
that, this argument is especially true for perceptual metrics. 
Therefore, it is very likely that AQM features have limited 
capability to capture the effects of embedding. To alleviate 
such problems, other researchers have used Hausdorff 
distance for measuring the effect of message embedding [22, 
23]. Hausdorff distance is fundamentally a max-min measure 
which has found numerous applications in template matching 
and content-based retrieval problems. Given two finite sets 
𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑚}  and 𝐵 = {𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑛}  the symmetric 
Hausdorff distance between them is defined as: 
𝐻(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝑚𝑎 𝑥(ℎ(𝐴, 𝐵), ℎ(𝐵, 𝐴))                                                (10) 
where, 
ℎ(𝐴, 𝐵) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑎𝑖∈𝐴
   𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑏𝑗∈𝐵
‖𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑗‖                                                        (11) 
These works also used noise removal for estimating 
the cover. Then, input signal and its estimated cover were 
segmented and decomposed with wavelet. Then, Hausdorff 
distance between each pair of sub-bands was calculated. Final 
features were HOS of Hausdorff distances over all frames. 
The system was tested on Steghide [9] and the result was 
compared with other steganalysis methods. Furthermore, 
discriminative capability of different sub-bands were 
investigated and it was shown that features extracted from 
lower levels of wavelet decomposition were more significant. 
Geetha et al. used the same idea for feature extraction, 
but investigated efficacy of six decision tree classifiers on 
different steganography and watermarking methods [23].  
2.2.1.3. Modelling the noise based on GMM and 
GGD 
Another solution for distinguishing between stego and 
cover is to compare distributions of their wavelet coefficients 
directly. Work of [24] used Gaussian mixture model (GMM) 
and generalized Gaussian distribution (GGD) for this purpose. 
To that end, two different methods were proposed. The first 
method modelled distribution of wavelet coefficients of all 
sub-bands with GMM and used them for steganalysis. In the 
second method, GGD and GMM were employed for 
capturing distributions of wavelet coefficients of signals and 
their de-noised counterparts. Finally, deviations between the 
two distributions were quantified with four different distance 
measures. Unfortunately, this work did not provide any result 
on the performance of the system. 
The same idea was investigated more properly in [25]. 
The authors showed that spread spectrum embedding causes 
the histogram of wavelet coefficients to become flatter 
around zero. GMM and GGD were employed to capture this 
flatness. The results showed that GMM captures artefacts of 
spread spectrum hiding more accurately, and the best 
performance was achieved when three Gaussian kernels were 
mixed. This work measured potency of individual features on 
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two different spread spectrum methods, but the system was 
not tested on combinations of more than one feature.  
2.2.2. Constant referencing (CIAQM) 
Previous methods used original signal for estimating 
the cover; and therefore they are called self-referencing. 
Avcibas showed that self-referencing (e.g., denoising) leads 
to dependence of features on the content of signals [26]. To 
alleviate this problem, he proposed the method of constant 
referencing. That is, two fixed reference signals were selected, 
one of which was a cover and the other one was its stego 
version. Let 𝑀(𝑥, 𝑦)  denotes a function that measures 
discrepancies between its two input signals x and y in a 
meaningful manner. Also, let r and r+e, denote the reference 
cover and its stego version, respectively. For every incoming 
signal (s), the proposed features (f) were defined as: 
𝑓(𝑠, 𝑟, 𝑟 + 𝑒) = 𝑀(𝑠, 𝑟) − 𝑀(𝑠, 𝑟 + 𝑒)                                           (12) 
Work of [26] showed that when mean and standard 
deviation are used for discrepancy measure (M), equation (12) 
is independent from the cover signal, but for the actual 
steganalysis system, AQMs were used to measure 
discrepancies (M) and classification was achieved through 
linear regression. The efficacy of this method was tested on 
six different embedding algorithms covering both 
steganography and watermarking methods. Simulations 
showed that constant referencing outperformed self-
referencing methods. Also, results showed that this 
improvement was more noticeable for steganography 
methods.  
2.2.3. Estimation of cover space model 
While previous works measured discrepancies 
between a reference and the signal for making the decision, 
another approach is possible if the high dimensional model of 
cover space is known. In this fashion we can check every 
signal x[n] with this model, if it fits the model, it is a cover 
and otherwise it is a stego. Unfortunately, a perfect model 
does not exist for empirical cover sources [6]. But this idea 
could be exploited for estimating a model for empirical cover 
signals. This approach was pursued by Johnson et al [27]. 
First, short time Fourier transform (STFT) was invoked to 
capture time-frequency regularities of audio signals. Then, 
PCA was used to extract a set of linear bases for this time-
frequency vector space. These linear bases formed a vector 
quantizer and the residual signal from this quantization was 
used to quantify accuracy of this sub-space for modelling the 
audio signal. Therefore, features were calculated as HOS of 
quantization error. Simulations were conducted on LSB 
embedding methods and results showed that this method 
achieves reasonable accuracy in LSB embedding when at 
least 4-bits are used for data hiding process. 
2.2.4. Re-embedding calibration 
Previous calibration methods are similar in the sense 
that estimation of covers were used for calibration. 
Calibrating features based on characteristics of stegos is 
another possibility that was pursued in [28]. That paper 
addressed both targeted and universal cases. In the targeted 
paradigm the embedding algorithm is known; therefore, 
signals were embedded with the same algorithm and a 
random message. Then, difference between features extracted 
from original signal and its embedded version were used for 
steganalysis. Let x[n], 𝒜𝑒𝑚  and m[n] denote a signal, the 
embedding algorithm, and a random message, then 
steganalysis features were defined as: 
?̃? 𝑛 = 𝒜𝑒𝑚(𝑥 𝑛 ,𝑚 𝑛 )                                                                   (13) 
𝐹 = 𝔉(𝑥 𝑛 ) − 𝔉(?̃? 𝑛 )                                                                     (14) 
where, 𝔉 denotes a suitable feature extraction process. This 
technique was later extended into universal paradigm, where 
embedding algorithm is not known. For this purpose, the 
concept of bit-plane sensitivity was defined as the amount of 
noise that is introduced into each bit-plane after random 
embedding. Let ℬ𝑖(𝑐), ℬ𝑖(𝑠), and BER(,) denotes bit-plane i 
of cover, bit-plane i of stego, and bit error rate. Equation (15) 
shows definition of bit-plane sensitivity for bit-plane i: 
𝕊𝑖 = 2 × 𝐵𝐸𝑅(ℬ𝑖(𝑐), ℬ𝑖(𝑠))                                                            (15) 
That work investigated sensitivity of different bit-planes 
of a wide range of data hiding algorithms and showed that 1-
LSB was the most sensitive bit-plane. Consequently, LSB re-
embedding was employed as a universal calibration method. 
Additionally, potency of cepstrum features were compared 
with energy of filter banks and it was shown that energy of 
filter banks were superior. Finally, due to positive effect of 
feature normalization and good performance of GA for 
feature selection [29], features were normalized and GA was 
invoked for feature selection. 
2.3.  Summary 
In this section a summary of the investigated methods 
is presented. First, we take a brief look on the relationship 
between different methods. Figure 5 presents how different 
works are inter-related to each other. 
 
One of the major differences between the reviewed 
papers was the data hiding algorithms that they were tested 
on. Investigated data hiding algorithms are presented in three 
different tables. Table 1 summarizes the watermarking 
methods, the symbol that we have used for referring to them, 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between different papers 
 
Method Ref. Section Method Ref. Section 
LPC [8] 2.1.1.2 AQM       [18] 2.2.1.1 
MFCC [15] 2.1.2.1 Hausdorff  [22, 23] 2.2.1.2 
D2-MFCC [16] 2.1.2.1 GMM [24, 25] 2.2.1.3 
Fusion [17] 2.1.2.1 CIAQM      [26] 2.2.2 
R-MFCC [19, 20] 2.1.2.2 Cal-R-Mel [28] 2.2.4 
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and their embedding domain. These methods include: 2A2W 
[30], COX [31], DSSS [32], Echo [32], FHSS, LSB 
watermarking [30], spread spectrum audio watermarking 
(SSAW) [33], WAWW [30], and multi carrier spread 
spectrum (MCSS) [34].  
 
Table 2 summarizes the LSB steganography methods, 
the symbol that we have used for referring to them, and their 
embedding domain. These methods include: Heutling [30], 
Hide4pgp [35], Invisible Secret [36], LSB Matching [37], 
Steganos [38], Steghide [9], Stools [39]. 
 
Information of non-LSB methods are presented in 
Table 3. These methods include: Addition Method (AM) [10], 
Amplitude Modulation (AMod) [40], DWT-FFT [41], DWT 
fusion [42], Mp3Stego [43], Publimark [30],  Quantization 
Index Method (QIM) [10], Stego wave [44], Stochastic 
Modulation (StMod) [45], WaSpStego [15], Wavelet LSB 
[10], Integer wavelet (I-Wavelet) [46], and DSSS in the 
frequency domain (DSSS + DCT) [47]. 
 
Table 4 presents the embedding algorithms that each 
paper has investigated.  
Different criteria may be defined to report efficacy of 
classification. Definition of these criteria are as follows. 
- True negative (TN): the number of cover samples 
that are classified as cover samples. 
- True positive (TP): the number of stego samples that 
are classified as stego samples. 
- False negative (FN): the number of stego samples 
that are classified as cover samples. 
- False positive (FP): the number of cover samples 
that are classified as stego samples. 
True positive rate (TPR) is the probability of detection of 
stego samples correctly and it is calculated as: 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
× 100%                                                                (16) 
True negative rate (TNR) is the probability of detection of 
cover samples correctly and it is calculated as: 
𝑇𝑁𝑅 =  
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
× 100%                                                                (17) 
Accuracy (Ac.) is the probability of correct classification and 
it is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑐.=  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
× 100%                                            (18) 
Other important differences between the reviewed 
methods were evaluation criteria, domain of feature 
extraction, number of features, type of classifier, number of 
clean files in their databases, size of training set, and their 
performances. These parameters are summarized in table 5.  
3. Targeted non-compressed methods  
HAS has a low differential sensitivity and it can only 
perceive relative phase of the signal [32].  Based on these 
characteristics different embedding methods have been 
proposed. This section presents steganalysis systems that 
have been designed specifically for their detection. 
3.1. Phase coding methods 
Steganalysis of phase coding system was investigated 
in [48]. This work observed that phase embedding preserves 
the relative phase of each block, but the phase difference 
between consecutive blocks are changed. To capture 
signatures of phase embedding, signal was segmented and 
unwrapped phase of all segments were calculated. The 
steganalysis features were statistical moments of the absolute 
difference between phases of consecutive segments. The 
system was tested for different length of blocks and subblocks.  
3.2. Echo embedding methods 
Echo hiding methods have a bank of kernels and 
depending on the bit of message, one of them is selected and 
is convolved with different segments of cover [4]. Therefore, 
kernels play an important role on the characteristics of echo 
hiding methods. For example, it is possible to design kernels 
that achieve better robustness. Positive-negative (PN) and 
forward-backward (FB) are examples of kernels that have 
been designed for such purposes. Let 𝛿 𝑛  denotes the 
impulse signal, then 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖  denotes an impulse signal 
which is centred at time 𝑑𝑖 and has amplitude of 𝛼. Impulse 
responses of famous kernels are as follows: 
ℎ𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 𝑛 = 𝛿 𝑛 + 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖                                                         (19)  
ℎ𝑃𝑁 𝑛 = 𝛿 𝑛 + 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖 − 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 − 𝑑′𝑖                                  (20) 
ℎ𝐹𝐵 𝑛 = 𝛿 𝑛 + 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 − 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛼𝛿 𝑛 + 𝑑𝑖                                   (21) 
 
Table 1. Specifications of watermarking methods 
Symbol Name Domain Ref. 
W1 2A2W wavelet [30] 
W2 COX Freq. [31] 
W3 DSSS Time [32] 
W4 Echo Time [32] 
W5 FHSS Freq. - 
W6 LSB 1-LSB [30] 
W7 SSAW Freq. [33] 
W8 VAWW wavelet [30] 
W9 MCSS Freq. [34] 
 
Table 2. Specifications of LSB-based steganography methods 
Symbol Name Domain Ref. 
SL1 Heutling 1-LSB [30] 
SL2 Hide4pgp 1- 4LSB [35] 
SL3 Invisible Secret 1-LSB [36] 
SL4 LSB Matching 1-LSB [37] 
SL5 Steganos LSB [38] 
SL6 Steghide 1-LSB [9] 
SL7 Stools LSB [39] 
 
Table 3. Specifications of non LSB-based steganography 
methods 
Symbol Name Domain Ref. 
SN1 AM wavelet [10] 
SN2 AMod Freq. [40] 
SN3 DWT-FFT Wavelet + Freq. [41] 
SN4 DWT fusion wavelet [42] 
SN5 Mp3stego Side Info [43] 
SN6 Publimark no information [30] 
SN7 QIM wavelet [10] 
SN8 Stego wave no information [44] 
SN9 StMod Time [45] 
SN10 WaSpStego wavelet [15] 
SN11 Wavelet LSB wavelet [10] 
SN12 I-Wavelet DWT [46] 
SN13 DSSS + DCT Freq. [47] 
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Table 4. Details of steganography methods investigated by each steganalysis paper 
 Steganalysis methods 
[7] [8] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [22] [23] [25] [26] [27] [28] 
W1                    
W2                    
W3                    
W4                    
W5                    
W6                    
W7                    
W8                    
W9                    
SL1                    
SL2                    
SL3                    
SL4                    
SL5                    
SL6                    
SL7                    
SN1                    
SN2                    
SN3                    
SN4                    
SN5                    
SN6                    
SN7                    
SN8                    
SN9                    
SN10                    
SN11                    
SN12                    
SN13                    
 
Table 5. Summary of universal steganalysis papers. Notations of the table are as follows -: not reported parameter, M: music samples, 
S: speech samples. Performance criteria are the average value over all embedding methods and capacities. 
Targeted Results Universal Results Train  
Size 
Clean 
 No. 
Classifier Feature  
No. 
Feature  
Domain 
Reference Method 
TNR TPR TNR TPR 
  - - - 30 Threshold 3 Bits [7] IDS 
94.91 99.24 - - 50% 500 SVM 40 Wavelet [8] LPC 
95.11 96.22 - - 62.5% 400 NN 36 Wavelet [10] Wavelet + PCA 
M:58.56 
S: 89.89 
M:69.14 
S: 91.37 
- - 50% 2554 SVM 22 chaotic [11] Chaotic 
Ac. = 92.2 - - 50% 12000 SVM 81 Time [12] Markov 
Ac.  = 97.3 - - 70% 19380 SVM 169 Time [13] Markov 
78.29 68.48 - - - 150 NN - Time [14] AR-TDNN 
- 66.04 - - 80% 389 SVM 36 Cepstrum [15] MFCC 
Ac.  = 85.9 - - 50% 12000 SVM 29 Freq. [16] D2-MFCC 
Ac.  = 90 Ac.  = 91 67% 600 SVM 12 Freq. [17] Feature Fusion 
92.75 93.5 79.7 81.8 50% 664 SVM 19 Time +  
Freq. 
[18] AQM 
94.71 97.29 - - 70% 4169 SVM 29 Freq. [19] RMFCC 
99.0 99.1 99.1 94.4 70% 4169 SVM 21 Freq. [20] RMFCC + HOS+GA 
88 95 - - 90% 994 SVM 25 Wavelet [22] Hausdorff 
72.89 88.64 - - 75% 200 J48 Tree 25 Wavelet [23] Hausdorff + tree 
91.22 93.44 - - 50% 1000 SVM 1 Wavelet [25] DWT+GMM 
95 95 - - 50% 100 linear  
regression 
19 Time + 
 Freq. 
[26] CIAQM 
98.1% 56.95 - - 80% 1800 SVM 4 STFT [27] STFT+PCA 
M:99.7 
S: 93.9 
M:99.5 
S:94.9 
M:99.8 
S: 96.7 
M:98.7 
S:87.8 
90% 4169 SVM 15 Freq. [28] Cal-R-Mel 
 
9 
 
If message is binary encoded, then 𝑖 ∈ {0,1} . Figure 6 
compares these different kernels. 
Targeted steganalysis of the basic kernel was first 
investigated in [49]. It was shown that for short windows, 
stegos have a peak in their power cepstrums. Therefore, 
cepstrum of the signal was calculated on short windows and 
different moments of local maxima of all windowed-
cepstrums were used for steganalysis. The method 
investigated effect of different parameters of the system. 
Steganalysis of echo hiding with PN kernels was 
discussed in [50]. They showed that the power cepstrum and 
the complex cepstrum of the stego signal exhibit peaks in 
delay positions of the kernels (𝑑𝑖). To detect these artefacts, 
the audio signal was segmented into 20ms chunks. Skewness 
of both the power cepstrum and the absolute value of the 
complex cepstrum over all frames were calculated. The 
steganalysis feature was defined as kurtosis of the calculated 
values of skewness. Simulation results showed that feature 
based on the absolute value of complex cepstrum was more 
discriminative than power cepstrum-based feature. 
Xie et al. went one step further and presented an active 
steganalysis on echo data hiding [51]. The proposed system 
was based on analysing the behaviour of cepstrum of a short 
sliding window. Based on that work, using a sliding window 
(Ws) smaller than the segment length, four situations will 
exist: 1) when Ws is inside a zero embedded segment, 2) when 
it is inside a one embedded segment, 3) when it is crossing 
from a one (zero) embedded into another one (zero) 
embedded segment, and 4) when it is crossing the border of 
two segments that have been embedded with different bits. 
The work showed that if histogram of peak position of all 
sliding cepstrums is plotted, it exhibits high densities around 
the value of delays. Furthermore, cepstrum peak location 
aggregation rate (CPLAR) was introduced as the ratio of the 
number of times that location of cepstrum peak was at one of 
those positions to the total number of windowed cepstrums. 
CPLAR was used for deciding about the presence/absence of 
the hidden message. The method was also able to find the 
length of segmentation in the embedding system. Extensive 
simulations were done on different echo kernels and the 
results showed that detection and estimation of parameters 
are harder when PN kernel is used.  
Recently, a more secure echo method was proposed in 
[4]. This work proposed that segment length and parameters 
of echo kernels be varied in a pseudo random fashion. 
Simulations of this work showed that this strategy makes 
CPLAR feature obsolete. Also, they showed this technique 
also improves robustness of the system against active warden.  
3.3. Multiplicative embedding methods 
A multiplicative steganography scheme can be 
expressed as: 
𝑠 𝑛 = 𝑐 𝑛 (1 + 𝑚 𝑛 )                                                                      (22) 
where s[n], c[n] and m[n] denote stego, cover, and the hidden 
message. According to equation (7) the steganography 
induced noise is equal to: 
𝑒 𝑛 = 𝑐 𝑛 .𝑚 𝑛                                                                                 (23) 
Apparently, this noise is multiplicative and cover dependent. 
Steganalysis of such embedding methods was presented in 
[52]. It was claimed that the conventional steganalysis 
methods cannot detect multiplicative systems properly. To 
address this problem, the logarithm of absolute value of audio 
samples was used. In this fashion, multiplicative noise was 
transformed into additive noise and then, wavelet was applied 
on this new signal. Statistical moments of signal and its sub-
band coefficients were extracted and they were appended 
with statistics of the linear prediction residue of each sub-
band [8]. The experimental results showed this technique 
improves detection of multiplicative steganography systems. 
3.4. Summary 
Targeted steganalysis papers are summarized in table 
6. 
4. Mp3 Steganalysis 
The mpeg-1 layer III (mp3) format provides high 
compression rate and good quality. These characteristics have 
turned mp3 into one of the most popular formats of audio 
signals. Consequently, it is a suitable medium for 
steganography. Over the past decade different mp3 
steganography methods have been developed. They include 
Mp3stego [43], under mp3 cover (Ump3c) [53], Mp3stegz 
 
Figure 6. Impulse response of different echo kernels (A, D) basic kernel (B, E) positive-negative kernel (C, F) forward-backward kernel 
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[54], Huffman table swapping [55], quantization step parity 
[56], Linbit [57], Bv-Stego [58], and other methods [59-61]. 
Current literature has only investigated steganalysis of 
Mp3stego and Ump3c. This section reviews their findings. 
Also, italic font is used to distinguish between the terms 
adopted from mp3 standard and the rest of the text. 
4.1. Steganalysis of Mp3stego 
Mp3 encoding procedure consists of two nested loops. 
In this fashion, the inner loop does the actual quantization of 
the data and determines the suitable quantizer step that meets 
with the available bit budget. On the other hand, the outer 
loop controls distortion of the encoding process and keeps it 
beyond the level of perception. Mp3stego changes the 
termination condition of inner loop and hides the message 
during the compression process.  
Using notation of mp3 standard, the part2_3_length is 
the field that determines the number of bits that are used for 
encoding of each frame. Mp3stego embeds bits of message as 
the parity of the part2_3_length variable by controlling when 
the inner loop is terminated [43]. Because Mp3stego hides the 
information during the compression process, many parts of 
mp3 are changed. Consequently, steganalysis of Mp3stego 
can be accomplished in different ways. They include variance 
of block sizes, numbers of different block lengths, MDCT 
coefficients, statistics of the bit reservoir, and statistics of 
quantization steps. 
4.1.1. Histogram of block length 
Westfeld investigated Mp3stego algorithm and 
concluded that block length of modified frames are smaller 
than their normal counterparts [62]. In other words, if the 
maximum length of frames were fixed, stego files would have 
lower bit rates. Of course this is not the case with mp3 
standard and the algorithm adjusts length of blocks to achieve 
the target average bit rate (e.g. 128k). Therefore, if bit rate of 
one block is decreased, next blocks will use those extra bits. 
This work showed that variance of block size is different 
between covers and stegos.  
4.1.2.  Number of different block lengths 
Investigating histogram of stegos and covers reveals 
that their block lengths are different. Specifically, Mp3stego 
leads to more different block lengths to be used. Based on this 
idea an ultra-light-weight steganalysis system was proposed 
in [7]. This system used length of the first block (F) as an 
estimation of the expected value of block length. Then the 
number of different block lengths in the file was calculated 
(C). After investigating the ratio of F/C for covers and stegos, 
they proposed the empirical value of 4.6 as the appropriate 
threshold. In this fashion, the ratio of F/C was larger than 4.6 
for covers. 
4.1.3. Statistics of MDCT coefficients 
Mp3stego increases quantization step of encoder. 
Apparently, this decreases the absolute value of MDCT 
coefficients. If statistical distributions of the MDCT 
coefficients are known, this extra distortion could be detected. 
This idea was pursued by Qiao et al. [63]. They extracted 
different statistical metrics from signal to capture any 
anomaly in its MDCT coefficients. First, GGD was used to 
model distribution of the MDCT coefficients in each frame.  
Second set of features were calculated from different sub-
bands of the second order derivatives of the MDCT 
coefficients. Finally, the third and fourth sets of features were 
Markov transition probabilities of inter-frame and intra-frame 
MDCT coefficients. In the simulations, different 
combinations of features were considered and the best result 
was achieved when all features were used. This work was 
improved in [64], which added feature selection to the method 
and used a bigger database for evaluation.  
Jin et al. used the same concept and extracted joint 
probability of adjacent MDCT coefficients in the same 
channel and the neighbour channel [65]. The work showed 
that:  
1) Features along the minor diagonal direction were 
more discriminative.  
2) Features in the center of the transitions matrix were 
more powerful.  
Based on these observations a method for reducing the 
number of features was proposed. This work was extended in 
[66] and features were extracted from difference of absolute 
values of MDCT in the inter and intra frames of mp3. 
4.1.4. Calibrated Mp3stego steganalysis 
Audio signals have a wide dynamic range, implying 
that some of their portions have fast transitions and are more 
complex. Apparently, reconstruction of these portions needs 
more bits. To solve this problem, mp3 standard benefits from 
a short buffer mechanism called bit reservoir. This technique 
keeps the average bit rate constant, but it allows individual 
frames to have different bit rates. In this fashion, frames with 
low complexities are encoded with fewer bits and the extra 
bits are saved for more complex frames. 
Frames that are embedded with Mp3stego typically 
have larger quantization steps. Therefore, their encoding 
requires fewer bits and the extra bits are stored in the bit 
reservoir. Consequently, statistics of the bit reservoir of stego 
would be different. This idea was presented in [67]. 
Furthermore, recompression calibration was used to remove 
effect of audio contents from the extracted features. The 
system was tested on mp3 with different bit rates. 
4.1.5. Statistics of quantization step 
Table 6. Summary of targetd steganalysis papers. Notations of the table are as follows -: not reported parameter  
Ref. Target 
method 
Domain Feature No. Classifier Cover No Train size Performance 
TPR TNR 
[48] Phase  Freq. 5 SVM 800 25% 98.2 95 
[49] Echo Freq. 8 SVM 1200 50% 82.17 87.83 
[50] Echo Freq. 1 SVM 300 17% 94 89.2 
[51] Echo Freq. 1 Threshold 200 - - - 
[52] Multiplicative wavelet 40 SVM 450 44% 94.8 96.4 
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Yan et al. observed that average value of the 
quantization steps between stegos and covers are the same but 
the difference between quantization steps of adjacent 
granules is increased [68]. According to the mp3 standard, 
both granules of the same frame use the same psychoacoustic 
model. Furthermore, it is logical to assume that consecutive 
granules have similar characteristics. This paper argued that 
embedding reduces such similarities. Assuming that the 
current granule is selected for embedding and its parity does 
not agree with the embedding bit, the algorithm increases the 
quantization step and adds the extra bits to the bit reservoir. 
If the next granule uses those extra bits, its quantization step 
is decreased. Therefore, the difference between quantization 
steps of two consecutive granules would increase. 
4.2.  Steganalysis of Ump3c 
Ump3c is another steganography tool for mp3 that 
hides information in the LSB of global gain of each granule. 
Ump3c and Mp3stego have the same capacity, but unlike 
Mp3stego, Ump3c works directly on mp3 files.  
Active steganalysis of Ump3c was conducted by Jin et 
al. [69]. Their method was a modified version of the regular-
singular (RS) image steganalysis. In the RS steganalysis, an 
invertible flipping function is defined. Then effect of 
applying the flipping function on the noise of signal is 
evaluated. Based on this criterion three groups of regular, 
singular and neither are defined for the case of increase, 
decrease, or no change in the noise of signal. Typically covers 
have higher number of regular groups.  
For steganalysis, global gains of mp3 were extracted 
and they were stored in the sequence 𝐺 = {𝑔𝑔 𝑘 }. Then, this 
sequence was segmented into groups of 4 samples with 
maximum overlap. If 𝑔𝑔𝑘 denotes segment k, it is defined as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑘 = {𝑔𝑔 𝑘 , 𝑔𝑔 𝑘 + 1 , 𝑔𝑔 𝑘 + 2 , 𝑔𝑔 𝑘 + 3 }                      (24) 
Then, noise of each group was measured using equation (25).  
𝒩(𝑔𝑔𝑘) = ∑|𝑔𝑔 𝑘 + 𝑖 −
2
𝑖=0
𝑔𝑔 𝑘 + 𝑖 + 1 |                                (25) 
Also, a set of flipping functions 𝐹: 𝑥 ↔ 𝑦 were defined such 
that if their input is x, their output will be y and vice versa.  
𝐹1: 0 ↔ 1, 2 ↔ 3,… , 254 ↔ 255                                                     (26) 
𝐹−1 : − 1 ↔ 0, 1 ↔ 2,… , 255 ↔ 256                                             (27) 
Then, flipping function F1 was applied on sequence G and its 
result was segmented and noise of each group was measured 
using equation (25). The same procedure was repeated for 
applying flipping function F-1. Finally, the number of regular 
and singular groups from both flipping functions were used 
to estimate the length of hidden message.  
4.3. Summary 
Summary of reviewed papers are presented in Table 7. 
5. Steganography and steganalysis of AAC 
Advanced audio coding (AAC) is another popular 
compressed audio format which is used by many audio/video 
streaming services and websites. AAC is the successor of 
mp3 and it uses perceptual coding and entropy coding for 
achieving high compression rate while maintaining quality of 
signal. There are lots of similarities between the two, but 
ACC can achieve the same level of quality for 70% of bit rate 
of mp3 [70]. 
5.1. AAC steganography 
AAC bit stream has different components and some of 
them have been used for steganographic purposes. They 
include Huffman table information, MDCT coefficients, and 
quantization parameters. 
Possibility of changing Huffman coding section for 
embedding was pursued in [71]. Another possible place for 
data hiding is the sign bit of code words [72]. This work used 
an interesting technique for minimizing the distortion at the 
expense of reducing the capacity. If XOR of two consecutive 
sign bits did not agree with the message, sign bit of the 
smaller coefficient was changed [72]. LSB embedding in 
MDCT coefficients is another promising trend which was 
proposed in [73]. For this purpose, embedding was done 
during the encoding process. More specifically, embedding 
algorithm enforced usage of a smaller scale factor and 
exploited the extra bits for carrying the message.  
Some other AAC embedding methods are direct 
adaptation from mp3 algorithms. Huffman tables of AAC can 
encode values of MDCT between 0 and 15 and therefore, 
frames with larger MDCTs use an especial symbol known as 
escape sequence. LSB of escape sequence in AAC was used 
for hiding information in [74]. This method is the counterpart 
of Linbit embedding in mp3 [57]. Bitrate steganography on 
AAC, hides message as the parity of the number of bits used 
for each frame [75] which is in parallel with mp3stego.  
Table 7. Summary of mp3 steganalysis papers. Notations of the table are as follows SI: side information, BPB: bit per bit, R: maximum 
capacity ratio, -: not reported parameters, : non-applicable parameters 
Ref. Target Method Domain Feature No. Classifier Train size Database Spec. Performance 
Clean No. Min Capacity TNR TPR 
[7] Mp3stego SI - Threshold - - 12.6% R 84.4 79.3 
[63] Mp3stego MDCT 214 SVM 75% 1000 16% R Ac. = 94.1 
[64] Mp3stego MDCT <200 SVM 60% 5000 40% R Ac. = 91.35 
 
[65] 
 
Mp3stego 
 
MDCT 
64 kb:41 
128 kb:115 
192 kb:212 
 
SVM 
 
- 
 
3000 
 
10% R 
 
86.48 
 
94.37 
[67] Mp3stego SI 1 SVM 50% 1200 0.001% BPB 75 73.38 
[68] Mp3stego SI 1 Threshold  1456 10% R 80 96.72 
[69] Ump3c SI    200 3.3% R   
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5.2. AAC steganalysis 
5.2.1. Calibrated Markov transition probability 
Work of [76] showed that Huffman changing method 
[71], changes correlation between adjacent scale factor bands. 
Based on this observation, Markov transition probability 
between indexes of Huffman codebook of consecutive scale 
factor bands were used. The method only investigated 
correlation between tables 1 to 10, so steganalysis system was 
constructed with 100 features. Finally, potency of 
steganalysis features were improved by re-compression 
calibration. Simulation results showed that calibration can 
improves the results up to 10%. 
5.2.2. Difference of inter and intra frame 
probabilities 
Transitions in audio signals are very smooth, so 
adjacent samples are highly correlated in both time and 
frequency. This characteristic was exploited for steganalysis 
of Huffman table sign method [72]. This approach was 
proposed in [77] where statistical characteristics of inter-
frame and intra-frame MDCT coefficients were used for 
steganalysis. The method constructed a rich model consisting 
of 1296 features and used ensemble classifier. To construct 
the rich model, based on their block types, AAC frames were 
divided into groups of short and long. Then, Markov 
transition probability and accumulative neighbouring joint 
density of first and second order derivative of inter and intra 
frames of each group were used as the final features.  
6. Evaluation of Audio Steganalysis methods 
6.1. Non-compressed methods 
Reviewing previous works on audio steganalysis 
shows some shortcomings: 
1- Most image steganalysis methods have been 
tested on BOSS or BOWS databases. Therefore, 
their reported results can be compared. On the 
other hand, in audio steganalysis such standard 
databases are not available and each work has 
used a different database. Evaluating performance 
of audio steganalysis methods on a single 
database makes a fair comparison between them 
possible, and alleviates this problem for future 
referencing. 
2- Different audio steganography techniques have 
been proposed, most of which are non-LSB 
methods. Referring to table 4, it is evident that 
there is not a balance between the amount of 
works published on LSB and non-LSB methods. 
Therefore, non-LSB methods have not been 
investigated properly.  
3- In practical situations the warden does not have 
any prior knowledge about the embedding 
algorithm. Thus, universal steganalysis resembles 
practical situations more closely. According to 
table 5, most of the previous works have only 
been investigated in the targeted scenario. 
Consequently, performance of many methods in 
universal scenario is not known. 
4- Previous works have shown that complexity of 
signal plays an important role on the performance 
of steganalysis system [13]. But, most of existing 
works have not investigated this property. 
In this section we try to fill these gaps. To that end, we 
used database of [20] which contained 4169 covers. Then, we 
embedded each cover with different methods and at different 
embedding capacities with random messages. LSB methods 
of Hide4pgp [35] and Steghide [9], non-LSB method of 
integer wavelet (I-wavelet) [46], and watermarking method 
of COX [31] were used for this purpose. In this manner our 
database had a total number of 54197 excerpts. We 
implemented some of the most recent and well-cited audio 
steganalysis methods and evaluated them in the both targeted 
and semi-blind universal paradigms. We used 10-fold cross 
validation and Matlab implementation of support vector 
machine (SVM) with "KernelScale” of Gaussian kernel, set 
to “auto”. Furthermore, if a certain method had pre-
processing (ex. feature normalization) or post-processing 
(feature selection) they were also implemented. Finally, 
complexity of all files were measured using equation (2) and 
then they were divided in three distinct sets. These regions 
were defined as follows. 
𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝐶𝑥 n ≤ 0.06                                                         (28) 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦: 0.06 < 𝐶𝑥 n < 0.12                                 (29) 
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦: 0.12 ≤ 𝐶𝑥 n                                                        (30) 
First, we evaluated each method in the targeted 
paradigm. Table 8 presents results of this analysis. The best 
results are shown in bold face letters.  
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) of different 
feature sets for detection of Steghide at capacity of 0.25 bit-
per-symbol (BPS) for low and medium complexities are 
shown in figure 7.  
Investigating results of table 8 and figure 7 shows that 
Cal-R-Mel has the best performance. Also, for most feature 
sets we see a negative correlation between complexity and 
performance. That is, signals with higher complexities are 
harder to detect. But at the same time, Markov feature does 
not follow this pattern. It is quite possible that if a better 
complexity measure is proposed, more meaningful results 
would be achieved.    
Performance of different methods in the universal 
paradigm is compared. These results are shown in table 9 with 
the best results shown in the bold face letters. 
 
 
Table 9. Comparison between different methods in the universal 
paradigm.  
Method Ref. Feature 
No 
Complexity Results 
TPR TNR Ac. 
 
D2-
MFCC 
 
[16] 
 
29 
low 77.7 89.9 83.8 
medium 62 77.2 69.6 
high 
 59.5 50.4 
 
R-MFCC 
 
[19] 
 
29 
low 78.8 90.6 84.7 
medium 75.1 85.7 80.4 
high 61.8 76.1 69 
R-
MFCC+ 
HOS+GA 
 
[20] 
 
7 
low 92.6 93 92.8 
medium 88.8 88.8 88.8 
high 
84.2 86.8 85.5 
 
Markov 
 
[13] 
 
169 
low 72.1 95.3 83.7 
medium 87.6 94.8 91.2 
high 94.2 95.5 94.9 
 
Cal-R-
Mel 
 
[28] 
 
15 
low 99.6 98.8 99.2 
medium 99.7 98.7 99.2 
high 
98.9 99.3 99.1 
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 Table 8. Accuracy of different feature sets in targeted scenario. Capacity is expressed in terms of bit-per-symbol (BPS) and accuracies 
lower than random guess (50%) are marked by . The number of features in each method is mentioned after their name in the () and the 
reference number of each method is mentioned in []. 
 
Method 
Capacity/ 
Param. 
 
Complexity 
D2-MFCC (29) 
[16] 
R-MFCC (29) 
[19] 
R-MFCC+ 
HOS+GA (7) 
[20] 
Markov (169) 
[13] 
Cal-R-Mel (15) 
[28] 
 
 
 
 
Hide4pgp 
 
C = 4 
low 95.7 99.7 99.9 100 100 
medium 83.6 100 100 100 100 
high 63.4 98.6 99.9 100 100 
 
C = 2 
low 64.9 99.1 99.9 100 100 
medium  97.1 99.5 100 100 
high  91.2 98.7 100 100 
 
C = 1 
low  97.4 99.4 99.3 100 
medium  90.8 97.4 99.9 100 
high  74.8 95.1 99.7 99.9 
 
 
 
Steghide 
 
C = 0.5 
low  95 98.8 89.5 100 
medium  86 95.7 95.3 100 
high  68.5 91.5 98 100 
 
C = 0.25 
low  88.2 96.5 74.3 99.9 
medium  76.5 90.2 88.6 99.6 
high  59.1 85.6 95.2 100 
 
C = 0.12 
low  78.5 90.8 51 99.6 
medium  66.2 83.8 73.1 99.5 
high   79 87.3 99.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I-wavelet 
 
 
C = 2 
low 91.1 99.8 99.9 100 100 
medium 72.5 99.6 100 100 100 
high  97.5 99.9 100 100 
 
C = 1 
low 52.5 98.6 99.8 99.6 100 
medium  95.8 99.2 100 100 
high  85.6 97.5 99.9 100 
 
C = 0.5 
low  93.6 98 98.6 99.9 
medium  83.8 94.2 99.7 99.8 
high  62.1 89 99.7 99.7 
 
C = 0.25 
low  85.3 94.6 90.8 99.9 
medium  71.4 86.2 96 99.5 
high   77 98.7 99.6 
 
C = 0.12 
low  72.6 85.1 71.3 99.4 
medium   70.1 89.3 98.9 
high   56.5 96.3 98 
 
COX 
 
α = 0.01 
low 99.9 99.8 100 100 99.8 
medium 97.7 99 99.7 100 99.4 
high 87.6 98.8 99.7 100 99.7 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. ROC of different feature sets for detection of Steghide at capacity of 0.25 BPS in the targeted paradigm  
 (A) low complexity (B) medium complexity 
 
 
(A) (B)
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ROC of different feature sets in the universal 
paradigm for low and medium complexities are shown in 
figure 8.  
Comparing results of table 9 and figure 8 shows that 
Cal-R-Mel outperforms other methods by a large margin.  
6.2. Mp3stego methods 
Three different methods for steganalysis of Mp3stego 
were implemented and they were tested for different signal 
complexities. Results of these simulations are presented in 
table 10.  
ROC of different feature sets for detection of Mp3stego at 
capacity of 12.5% for low and medium complexities are 
shown in figure 9.  
Based on result of table 10 we can conclude that 
method of differential quantization, outperforms other 
steganalysis methods. 
7. Future Works 
This section discusses some directions that may be worth 
further investigation.  
1- Steganalysis is implementation of a passive warden. 
On the other hand, active warden can measure 
robustness of steganography methods. This 
approach has not been addressed adequately in audio 
steganography. Investigating, robustness of existing 
methods to active warden and findings more robust 
methods can address this shortcoming. 
2- Most of the reviewed papers have used the detection 
of watermarking systems (table 4) as an estimation 
of performance of steganalysis system on robust 
steganography methods. Comparing objectives of 
steganography and watermarking methods shows 
that undetectability is not the concern of 
watermarking. Therefore, reliable detection of 
watermarking systems cannot be interpreted as 
reliable detection of robust steganography methods. 
Detection of robust steganography methods should 
be analyzed separately. 
3- Referring to table 4, it is evident that there is not a 
balance between the amount of works on LSB and 
non-LSB methods. Although, we tried to address 
this in section 6, yet non-LSB methods need more 
investigations. 
4- According to table 5, most of the previous works 
have only investigated targeted steganalysis. We 
tried to address this by evaluating some methods 
under semi-blind scenario in section 6. Future works 
may focus on blind universal audio steganalysis. 
5- A lot of powerful image steganalysis methods are 
based on calibration. A more thorough investigation 
of cover/stego estimation techniques in audio and 
proposing an efficient method would improve 
performance of steganalysis. 
6- While there is a rich literature on steganalysis, cover 
space has not been studied properly. Specifically, 
the impact of cover contents (speech/music or genre 
of music), sampling frequency, quantization depth 
and etc. on steganalysis systems should be 
investigated. 
7- The idea of signal complexity and its impact on 
steganalysis was proposed in [12]. Our analysis in 
section 6 showed that sometimes the existing metric 
does not work. Conducting a formal analysis on 
signal complexity and proposing a better measure 
for steganalysis applications would be fruitful for 
both steganography and steganalysis applications. 
8- Most of current steganalysis methods process one 
frame of the signal and then use their moments for 
steganalysis. A framed based method is another 
approach that has not been considered yet. Such 
method may make a decision about every frame and 
then use an appropriate rule for making the final 
decision. Also, such methods would be very 
beneficial for steganography and its results can be 
used for better understanding the cover space and 
implementing adaptive steganography methods. 
9- Previous works have shown the effect of audio 
contents on the result of steganalysis [11, 28]. 
Therefore, implementing a proper clustering method 
before steganalysis and investigating its effect 
seems to be fruitful. 
 
Figure 8. ROC of different feature sets in the universal paradigm (A) low complexity (B) medium complexity 
 
(A) (B)
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10- Current literature has only considered steganalysis 
of mono signals. Investigating the correlation 
between different channels of stereo signals may 
improve performance of steganalysis. 
11- Referring to table 5, most methods have used SVM 
for classification. On the other hand, recent image 
steganalysis methods suggest that better 
performances may be achieved if rich models with 
ensemble classifiers are employed. Furthermore, 
recent trends in pattern recognition tasks have turned 
considerably in favor of deep learning techniques. 
But, such approaches have not been investigated for 
audio steganalysis. 
12- The main focus of mp3 steganalysis methods has 
been on Mp3stego. Consequently, most of mp3 
methods have not been investigated at all. 
Steganalysis of those methods should be addressed. 
13- Different encoders for mp3 are available and they 
exhibit quite different characteristics [78, 79]. 
Studying the effect of those differences on 
steganalysis systems seems another direction that 
needs more investigation. 
14- Due to wide spread usage of AAC in many 
audio/video streaming services it could be one of the 
best covers for steganography. Unfortunately, 
neither steganography nor steganalysis of AAC has 
found adequate attentions.  
8. Conclusion 
This work conducted a comprehensive review of audio 
steganalysis literature and classified them into different 
categories. Reviewing the audio steganalysis literature 
showed that their main contributions had been their feature 
extractions. Therefore, we specifically paid more attention to 
that part. Considering the type of cover signal, existing 
methods were broadly divided into non-compressed (wave) 
and compressed (mp3 and AAC) methods. Furthermore, 
considering the absence/presence of knowledge about the 
embedding algorithm, the systems were divided into two sub-
groups of universal and targeted methods. For a better 
comparison between different works, each subsection of the 
paper was concluded with a summary of the relevant papers. 
Also, to conduct a fair comparison between different methods, 
some of them were implemented and were tested on the same 
database, on both LSB and non-LSB steganography methods, 
Table 10. Accuracy of different feature sets. Capacity is expressed as percentage of maximum embedding capacity. The number of 
features in each method is mentioned after their name in the () and the reference number of each method is mentioned in []. 
 
Capacity 
 
Complexity 
MDCT (48) 
[64] 
 Differential Quantization (1) 
[68] 
 DAMDCT (34) 
 [66] 
TPR TNR Ac.  TPR TNR Ac.  TPR TNR Ac. 
 
100 
low 95 95 95  96.6 94.6 96.6  92.9 95.5 94.2 
medium 94.4 94.9 94.6  97.4 95.7 97.4  92.6 94.3 93.5 
high 95.6 94.9 95.3  96.7 94.9 96.7  91.8 95.4 93.6 
 
50 
low 90.8 90.8 90.8  95.5 93 95.5  93.8 95.3 94.6 
medium 91 90 90.5  95.7 93.6 95.7  91.6 94 92.8 
high 91.7 90.4 91.1  94.5 92.6 94.5  92.1 95.3 93.7 
 
25 
low 88.4 87.1 87.8  94.2 92.3 94.2  93.4 94.3 93.9 
medium 88.6 86.8 87.7  95.4 92.6 95.4  91.4 94.5 92.9 
high 89.2 87.1 88.1  91.7 87.7 91.7  91.5 94.4 93 
 
12.5 
low 87.8 86.8 87.3  94.3 91.3 94.3  93.2 94.5 93.9 
medium 86.6 86.6 86.6  95.3 92.5 95.3  91.2 94.4 92.8 
high 89.3 87.8 88.6  92.2 88 92.2  92.6 93.9 93.3 
 
 
Figure 9. ROC of different feature sets for detection of mp3stego at capacity of 12.5%  
 (A) low complexity (B) medium complexity 
 
(A) (B)
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and in both targeted and universal scenarios. In the end, some 
future directions for audio steganalysis were discussed. 
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